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chapter 1  
The anthropology of Suicide:  
ethnography and the Tension of agency
daniel Münster and Ludek Broz1
“everyone dies … 
Very few people kill themselves”
emile durkheim 1952: 267
Suicide is a challenging object of study. as ian Hacking has recently claimed, 
“[t]he meanings of suicide itself are so protean across time and space that it is not 
so clear that there is one thing, suicide” (2008: 1). For anthropology, the particular 
challenge lies in thinking beyond some of the assumptions implicit in the powerful 
and widespread clinical conceptualization of suicide, which presents it as a 
pathological and individual act, committed with willful intent, full consciousness 
and unambiguous authorship, whose default subject is arguably a “Western,” male, 
white, middle-class human. These implicit assumptions serve as a “gold standard” 
of real suicide, to which all acts of self-harm are compared or ultimately attributed. 
in this volume, however, we aim at abandoning such assumptions in favor of non-
european experiences of self-harm in order to re-examine critically the Western 
tradition of thinking about suicide.
The ethnographies assembled in this volume engage with cultural practices 
of making sense of suicide, and in particular with the multitude of questions 
and answers about agency, personhood, and death that circulate within specific 
vernacular and expert regimes of knowledge around the issue of suicide. When 
families, neighbors, religious specialists, doctors, public health experts, activists, 
and newsmakers speculate about possible motives and reasons behind suicides, 
they operate with assumptions about free will, suffering, authorship, power and 
personhood and about “the very quality of life experienced by someone who 
chooses to die” (Marks 2003: 308). By recording and analyzing ethnographic 
instances of such sense-making, this volume seeks to highlight the ambivalent 
1 The introduction has benefitted from insightful comments, suggestions, and 
criticisms by many people. We are particularly grateful to katrina Jaworski and Jocelyn 
chua for their critical readings of earlier drafts. Both editors have contributed equally 
to the writing of the introduction as well as to the editing of the book as a whole. The 
decision to put Broz’s name as first editor of the volume and Münster’s as first author of the 
introduction was arbitrary.
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position of agency in contemporary understandings of suicide. The focus is on 
rationalizations of suicide events—popular, expert and scientific—and how they 
articulate situated ideas about human personhood, the morality of death, and the 
human capacity to voice dissent and act politically through self-inflicted death.
in this opening chapter we develop our argument about the centrality of agency, 
personhood, and power for the anthropology of suicide by dealing first with the 
core premises of what we like to call the “mainstream” of suicide studies and the 
counter-hegemonic potential of the ethnographic approach. Second, we elaborate 
on what we identify as the central tension of agency in suicide by focusing on 
both scientific epistemologies and vernacular understandings of the phenomenon 
as manifested in the ethnographic record. Third, we discuss the challenge that 
the anthropological work on personhood poses for the Western Self implicit in 
suicide studies. Finally, we connect agency in suicide to the question of “power” 
by focusing, on the one hand, on ideas about the human capacity to performatively 
express dissent and to act politically through self-inflicted death and, on the 
other hand, on the diagnostic potential of suicide ethnography for the study of 
structural violence.
* * *
For numerous thinkers throughout history (notably philosophers), suicide has 
pointed to central questions about the human condition. as the existential 
philosopher albert camus claimed famously, “There is but one truly serious 
philosophical problem, and that is suicide” (1955: 3). Building on the centrality 
of suicide for camus, anthropologists James Staples and Tom Widger argue that 
“[q]uestions of existence, survival, and coping …, whether one agrees with 
camus or not, are surely crucial for human beings everywhere, and go straight 
to the centre of anthropological enquiry” (Staples and Widger 2012: 185). yet the 
potential significance of suicide for ethnographic understandings of the human 
condition stands in stark contrast to the relative silence on the subject within social 
and cultural anthropology as academic disciplines. in fact, anthropology has been 
a latecomer to the systematic study of suicide, leaving as yet little trace in suicide 
studies (for a review of some recent anthropological contributions, see Macdonald 
2007; Staples and Widger 2012).
We argue that the reasons for the reluctance of social and cultural anthropology 
to afford greater attention to suicide are to be found in the epistemological and 
methodological challenge of studying suicide ethnographically. anthropology has 
historically aimed at generalizing cultural forms (e.g. norms, types, structures, 
patterns) uncovered through long-term ethnographic engagements with everyday 
life contexts, thus focusing on regular and quotidian rather than the exceptional 
and contingent. However, in the context of a particular locality, suicides are 
contingent phenomena whose occurrence cannot be foreseen as only rarely do 
individuals actively and successfully seek to end their own lives. The average 
Suicide Mortality Rate (SMR) for “Western” countries suggests that for every 
The Anthropology of Suicide 5
ten persons who commit suicide in any given year, nearly a hundred thousand do 
not.2 and yet, despite—or because of—the exceptionality of suicide (Morrissey 
2006: 1) that has largely prevented anthropology from a substantial ethnographic 
contribution to its study, there seems to be an impulse, among both researchers and 
the population at large, to make sense of suicide cases in relation to extrapersonal 
issues. Regardless of the statistical odds, most human societies tend to treat 
suicides not as idiosyncratic and exceptional ways of dying but as a kind of death 
indicative of larger, more significant issues, such as ruptures in social, economic, 
and moral life.
Suicidology has addressed the problem of exceptionality in two ways. One 
approach involves the use of what nicolas Rose calls “psy knowledge, techniques, 
explanations, and experts” (2006: 12). Psy stands for “the psychosciences and 
disciplines psychology, psychiatry, and their cognates” (Rose 1998: 3), fields that 
have contributed to the medicalization and pathologization of suicide since the 
nineteenth century. From this perspective cases of suicide become integrated into a 
clinical picture and, in ian Marsh’s words, a “compulsory ontology of pathology” 
(Marsh 2010: 31). The second approach deals with the exceptionality of suicide 
through quantitative regimes of representation (cf. Hacking 1990). The disciplines 
that rely on statistical aggregation of large population numbers in the form of 
suicide rates (e.g. sociology, criminology, demography, and public health) also 
grew in the nineteenth century, this time out of the field of moral statistics which 
dealt with deviance and social problems. Both of these epistemic clusters offer 
particular solutions to the methodological problem of the rarity of suicide and 
provide implicit clues in the search for meaning in suicide: medicalization has 
rationalized suicide in terms of pathology, while quantification has demonstrated 
statistical correlations between suicide and other (national) indicators of health 
and well-being of populations.
These expert knowledge regimes on suicide entail a logical tension which we 
refer to as the tension of agency: the dialectic of agency and patiency. On the one 
hand, they build on a specific Western notion of agency and subjectivity by defining 
the object of study—suicide—as intentional, agentive action. This intentionality 
distinguishes suicide sharply from “normal ways of dying.” On the other hand, 
these knowledge regimes partly deny agency (as free will) to the suicidal 
person by invoking allegedly universal causes that are beyond the individual’s 
(conscious) control and possibly outside of their personhood altogether, such 
as depression, serotonin levels, gender, genetics, sexual orientation, or financial 
crises. This tension of agency, the simultaneous reliance on and denial of agency, 
sometimes comes with a dismissal of situated political and cultural meanings of 
self-destructive acts in suicidology.
2 See World Health Organization for national rates of suicide mortality (based on 
successful suicides per 100,000 persons per year) (http://www.who.int/mental_health/
prevention/suicide_rates/en/index.html, accessed 12 november 2013).
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The tension of agency is not only built into medical and sociological 
suicidology but is also implicit in most vernacular discourses about suicide. The 
tension, the necessity and denial of agency, seems to us to be connected to the very 
widespread classification of suicides as a “bad death” (Seale and van der Geest 
2004). Suicide, Parry and Bloch argue, is the “supreme example of bad death”: the 
self-destruction of a person “is regarded with such incomparable horror” in many 
cultures because their “soul may forever be excluded from the society of the dead 
and must wander the earth as a lonely and malignant ghost, while the corpse may 
not be accorded the normal rites of disposal …” (Bloch and Parry 1982: 16). The 
abnormality of and moral outrage surrounding suicide in turn require a clear ruling 
as to whether a particular case of death must be regarded as a suicide as opposed 
to a normal or “good” death. What makes most suicides “bad” deaths seems to be 
the agentive decision to end one’s life, that is the will to die, or the act of giving 
in to the “death wish” as Freudians would call it (see Menninger 1938). in other 
words, there is no suicide without agency, or to be more precise, there is no suicide 
without intentionality. almost universally—and across the registers of vernacular 
and expert knowledge —agency appears to be a fundamental component of suicide 
as bad death.
The centrality of agency in vernacular definitions of suicide thus stands in 
tension with equally widespread assumptions about victimhood or “patiency” 
(Schnepel 2009) in suicide, which hold that the act is caused by influence of 
agents, forces, or structures located outside the person, such as demons, kin 
relations, illness, or violence. attempts at locating agency outside of the suicidal 
person have historically been important in deflecting moral or legal sanction away 
from the suicidal person or, as we prefer to call them, the suicidé.3 as historian 
Rab Houston points out, the growing popularity of legal and medical verdicts of 
“lacking wrongful intent” (non compos mentis) among forensic coroners after 1750 
went hand in hand with a substitution of ideas of sinful blasphemy for medicalized 
explanations (Houston 2009).
counter to extra-personal explanations for suicides are issues to be explained 
by suicide. Suicide events are often assumed to point toward broader social 
problems in the wider world. The questions they pose may then assume a political 
character. How, for example, should one make sense of the fact that more uS 
soldiers have died from suicide than in combat since the war in afghanistan 
began (gibbs and Thompson 2012)? does this fact tell us something about gender 
(masculinity), bureaucratic indifference, or institutional pressure in the military? 
3 In this introduction we use the French word suicidé to refer to the person committing/
attempting/contemplating suicide. This avoids the potential confusion of referring to both the 
(suicide) act and the (suicide) victim by the same term “suicide,” as is common in the english 
language. More importantly, suicidé is grammatically a peculiar passive-active construction 
(like employee—an agent, but not quite as active as its counterpart, the employer). We 
therefore prefer the term over the commonly used “suicide victim” “suicide completer” and 
“suicide attempter,” as each of these stresses only one aspect of the agency/patiency divide.
The Anthropology of Suicide 7
Similarly, what is to be made of the news that suicide rates in europe increased 
following the financial crisis or that, following the suicides of several people 
dispossessed of their homes, Spanish banks had to temporarily suspend evictions 
(dowsett 2012)? What is to be learned from the study of these news reports 
about alienation, fear, and the structural violence of economic orders? From an 
anthropological perspective, the question can be formulated thus: How can we 
appreciate the diagnostic potential of suicide cases—their inherently accusatory 
nature and their seismographic detection of social dysfunctionality and structural 
violence—without, however, resorting to universalizing positivism that ignores 
context-specific understandings of the indictment expressed through suicide? The 
anthropology of suicide must acknowledge that the diagnostic potential of suicide 
cases is equally shaped by history and power.
The central challenge for an anthropology of suicide is to uncover and describe 
the peculiar tension of agency prevalent in specific ethnographic settings, including 
in their inhabitants’ explanatory repertoire and in the explanatory repertoire of 
anthropology itself. This means making sense of agency and patiency in situated 
discourses and in expert knowledge regimes that come to bear on particular cases 
of self-destruction. With such focus, anthropology may be able to contribute novel 
perspective to medical and sociological suicidology, to which we turn next.
Disciplining Suicide and the Challenge of ethnography
The secularization of suicide since the eighteenth century has replaced its 
theological conception as a mortal sin and abomination (Weaver and Wright 2009) 
and given rise to two major currents of european thought on the issue, which 
anthony giddens calls the “thèse psychiatrique” and the “thèse sociologique” 
(1977: 328). While the psychiatric thesis, or “psy” discourse as ian Marsh 
(2010)—following nicolas Rose (1998)—calls it, transformed suicide from sin 
to mental disease and thereby relocated it into the realm of medical sciences, the 
sociological thesis detached suicide from moral consideration at the individual 
level by treating suicide rates as quantitative indicators of social constraints on the 
individual. Although the two currents or scientific ontologies (psychiatric medical 
sciences, quantitative epidemiology and sociology) have general applicability, the 
topic of suicide was instrumental in their creation and consolidation. consequently, 
suicide was “pathologized” at the individual level by medicalization and at the 
collective level by the removal of any moorings within individual contexts and by 
understanding suicide rates as social facts indexing large-scale social turbulences, 
social pathologies or “anomie” in durkheim’s classical formulation (1952: 201–39). 
These two currents of thought have shaped commonsense understandings of suicide 
worldwide and laid the foundations for suicide studies as a modern discipline.
Suicidology is a complex and well-established field (see Shneidman 2001) 
inhabiting the intersection of clinical psychology, public health, and quantitative 
sociology. Range and Leache’s review (1998) of leading journals in suicidology 
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acknowledges some of the discipline’s major achievements, which include 
gathering impressive knowledge about risk factors in relation to age, gender, 
and mental health. Suicidology has refined classification algorithms for suicide, 
calculates probabilities and can provide statistics of suicidal ideation (talk of 
suicide) among certain at-risk groups or predict the prospects of medication and 
cognitive-behavioral therapy among suicidal clinical patients. despite all this 
knowledge and an increasingly fine-grained vocabulary that distinguishes between 
suicide attempts, suicide ideation, acts of self-harm, and suicide mortality, suicide 
as a concept remains complicated. The idea of suicide in suicidology, Range and 
Leach argue, retains “philosophical roots in logical positivism and structural 
determinism” (1998: 24).
The authors in this volume share the view that anthropology, with its emphasis 
on ethnography, offers a valuable alternative to the predominantly applied research 
agendas of suicidology. Perhaps most importantly, anthropology as we understand 
it aims at a symmetrical treatment of expert and vernacular modes of making sense 
of suicides. in the domain of the “thèse psychiatrique,” much of critical medical 
anthropology today destabilizes eurocentric certainties surrounding the medical 
sciences’ knowledge claims by bringing in questions of power, the geopolitics 
of knowledge, and divergent ontologies of body, personhood, health/well-being, 
and death. The growing interest in the anthropology of suicide more generally, to 
which this volume attests, is a catalyst for the “provincialization” of suicidology’s 
taken-for-granted ideas about personhood or subjectivity.
in the domain of the “thèse sociologique,” ethnography also adds a 
complementary perspective to statistical approaches. Many authors, most 
prominently perhaps sociologist Jack douglas (1967: 167–210), have pointed to 
the methodological problems involved in the positivist production of and reliance 
on aggregate suicide data. These problems are well known and include the way 
coroners and police investigators are required to produce unambiguous results, the 
way legal implications, stigma, and shame may encourage community members 
to conceal suicides from the authorities, and the way national and transnational 
statistical organizations, such as national crime records bureaus or the World 
Health Organization, produce their data. However questionable the production of 
suicide statistics may be, ethnographers of suicide cannot afford not to take suicide 
statistics seriously. This is because modern suicide is entangled in a world of 
indicators: suicide statistics are social facts, not in the way durkheim understood 
them, as seismic instruments that speak of the inner life of society, but in Paul 
Rabinow’s sense that “representations are social facts” (1986). anthropologists 
have not come to believe unquestioningly in the ontological foundations of 
statistical indicators; instead, they have begun to appreciate the performative 
power of science and state-produced representations of social problems. To put 
it another way, anthropology has made statistical representations and their effects 
on populations the object of ethnographic inquiry (e.g. Li 2007; Münster 2012).
The anthropological study of suicide must not be limited to producing 
intimate ethnographies of individual suicide cases. it would be a mistake to 
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reduce the potential of ethnography in the study of suicide to the role of adding 
cultural context to an understanding of individual suicide cases. in other words, 
a turn to situated life histories and narratives of suicides is not a panacea for all 
methodological fallacies of statistical and psychological approaches to suicide. 
French anthropologist charles Macdonald has pointed out that conventional 
ethnographic approaches are prone to what he calls “the case studies fallacy.” By 
this he means the problem that the sequence of events and circumstances that is 
often singled out to explain a suicide case would be meaningless without the final 
act of self-harm: “Suppose now that the same case or sequence of events is told, 
but omitting the final n+1—then what? The whole case vanishes altogether as a 
suicide story, but it remains a perfectly plausible life story, perhaps sad, but not 
ending in death” (Macdonald 2007: 227). The case studies approach, employed 
in many classical ethnographies (Bohannan 1960; Firth 1961; Malinowski 1978) 
thus suffers from an inherent drive to explain suicide cases by the sequence of 
events preceding the suicide, while ignoring similar sequences that were not 
followed by suicide. in other words, the meaning ascribed to particular events 
in life is determined by viewing them retrospectively through the lens of suicide.
The ethnographies assembled in this volume (not all chapters are ethnographic; 
see Jaworski, Sharp and Linos) take a different route altogether. Their intention 
is neither to uncover the one interpretive key to unlock the meaning of suicide 
practices in society X nor to explain suicide rates with reference to transformations 
in society y. instead, the chapters collected here use ethnography to interrogate the 
boundaries of the category of suicide itself and to make important points about 
the discursive uses of suicide in everyday life. given this, it is scarcely the aim 
of the authors to achieve an ethnographic proximity to suicide, in the sense of 
getting as close as possible in a temporal, spatial, or empathic sense to suicide 
acts. Rather, they study what may be called suicide fields—the wider domains 
of practices and of sense making, out of which realized, imaginary, or disputed 
suicides emerge. instead of producing claims about the causality of suicide, which 
would compete with psychological or sociological accounts, the ethnographic 
approach substitutes analytical explanations of suicide(s) for the study of “popular 
discourse about causality” (Staples, this volume), the “moral talk about farmers’ 
suicides” (Münster, this volume), children’s suicide games (Widger, this volume), 
or “women’s allusions to, jokes about, and fantasies of willful death” (chua, this 
volume). Representations of real and imaginary suicide provide idioms through 
which ethnographers may engage in conversation about culturally specific notions 
of illfare and the good life. although ethnographers may engage with suicide in 
order to speak about gender, youth, neoliberalism, or agrarian ecologies, among 
other things, the study of suicide is more than another arbitrary entry point for 
the anthropological study of social and cultural complexity. Suicide, as a way 
of “death making” (chua, this volume) and as bad death, seems to offer unique 
opportunities for speaking about existential matters: life and death, justice and 
revenge, success and failure, power and resistance, personhood and individuality, 
agency and victimhood.
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Our enthusiasm about ethnographic approaches nevertheless should not be 
mistaken for anthropological complacency. Though the anthropology of suicide 
has sought to decenter Western ontologies, avoid the pathologizing psy-discourse 
and interrogate positivist frameworks of suicidology, it may not be able to 
resolve the tension of agency inherent to the “thèse psychiatrique” and the “thèse 
sociologique,” either: ethnographers, like everyone else, simultaneously ask why 
the suicidé “did” it and who or what “made them do” it. In most ethnographic 
studies, suicides are treated both as indications of individual choices and 
pathologies and as diagnostics of larger structural constellations. What perhaps 
differentiates ethnographic studies of suicide from their counterparts in sociology 
and psychology is their symmetrical treatment of popular and authoritative 
knowledge about suicide. In the anthropology of suicide, scientific, administrative 
and legal representations about suicide become objects of investigation. Reyes-
Foster’s chapter explores Mexican expert knowledge systems and vernacular 
modes of making sense of suicide in a single framework as commensurable 
and curiously entangled discourses. Münster’s chapter discusses how the media 
hype around Indian farmers’ suicides and the classification of a South Indian 
region as “suicide prone” by the developmental state feeds back into vernacular 
debates about suicide and possibly into suicidal practices. This looping effect is 
also pointed out by Tom Waidzunas, who, drawing on ian Hacking, argues that 
the circulation of statistical representations of gay teen suicides has problematic 
effects on the identity formation of young gays (Waidzunas 2011).
The authors in this volume cannot and need not compete with the scientific 
methodologies and epistemologies of suicidology. Instead of struggling to define 
suicide or to explain its positive correlation to neurobiological, genetic, or social-
structural properties, the ethnographies assembled here largely seek to explore the 
fuzzy edges of the concept of suicide and the practices of self-destruction. instead 
of starting off from a definition of the core concept, which would be dependent 
on modernist dichotomies and implicit notions of agency and personhood, 
many authors in this volume approach suicide and agency via phenomena that 
may or may not fall under the rubric of suicide “proper.” Flora’s greenlandic 
ethnography critiques durkheimian understandings of suicide by focusing its 
ethnographic lenses on walking into the wilderness, another form of willful death, 
or rather, as Flora would put it, another form of self-detachment, known locally 
as qivittoq. Chua’s, Staples’s and Widger’s ethnographies explore the fine line 
between suicide and what suicidologists would call “suicide ideation”: imagining, 
invoking, playing, threatening, and staging suicide. Focusing ethnographically on 
such non-fatal suicidal action avoids, in chua’s words, “presumptive framings 
about intentionality, sincerity, destruction, and fatality” in the suicide analysis. 
Münster’s ethnography also maintains analytical distance from the actuality of 
suicide cases and possible reasons for farmers’ suicides, focusing instead on 
situated accounts—the various ways of writing and talking about the subject. 
He shows how the moral panic about such suicides becomes a productive idiom 
for farmers to rethink their agrarian practices. Sharp and Linos develop an 
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anthropological understanding of Palestinian suicide bombings, yet another self-
destructive practice that, being notoriously difficult to frame as either pathology or 
anemia, is peripheral to the focus of suicidology—it is too violent against others, 
overtly tactical, and political. By focusing on suicide attacks, Sharp and Linos 
make a convincing case for widening our understanding of personhood within 
anthropologies of suicide to include the actual materiality of the person as a 
“corporeal entity.”
dwelling analytically at the boundaries of what people in general and scientists 
more specifically call suicide has proven to be productive for anthropology and 
related disciplines. Rane Willerslev (2009) presented the voluntary assisted death 
among Chukchi reindeer herders as a form of sacrifice that is locally perceived as 
categorically and morally distinct from suicide “proper.” James Laidlaw (2005) 
pointed out the distinction drawn between voluntary fasting to death as a spiritual 
practice among indian Jains and the same community’s ridicule of “real” suicide 
as fool’s death. Such works, together with the empirical material collected in this 
volume, suggest that questions about agency, which include issues of intentionality, 
knowledge, “voluntarism” (Osborne 2005), and responsibility, are central to the 
boundary work around the term suicide and hence for defining the object of study. 
in the following section, we elaborate on the logical tension of agency in scholarly, 
expert and lay engagements with suicide cases.
The Tension of Agency: Denial, Necessity, and Ambivalence in Definitions 
of Suicide
The International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health 
Problems (icd-10) issued by the World Health Organization lists “intentional 
self-harm” in the section titled “external causes of Morbidity and Mortality.”4 
Hence the causes of intentional self-harm, which include suicide, are classified 
alongside assaults, traffic accidents and “complications of medical and surgical 
care,” as external to the victim. Without wishing to labor this point, we believe 
that the categorical paradox epitomizes a more general tension between the 
requirement for agency and a simultaneous denial or diffusion of the agency of 
the suicidé in both popular and scientific understandings of suicide. This is at the 
same time a tension between two notions of the term “agency”: intentionality and 
responsibility. Suicide categorically requires singular and undivided intention, yet 
cultural etiologies of suicide rarely attribute full responsibility to the agent. in 
suicide discourse, singular intention stands in tension with diffused responsibility. 
For modern understandings of suicide, the diffusion of agency is mediated via 
sociological and psychological approaches.
4 Available online at http://apps.who.int/classifications/icd10/browse/2010/en (accessed 
30 March 2012).
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To develop our argument, we start by looking at the way suicidology defines 
its object of study. Emile Durkheim defined suicide as “all cases of death resulting 
directly or indirectly from a positive or negative act of the victim himself, which he 
knows will produce this result” (durkheim 1952: xii; original emphasis replaced 
by our emphasis). One of the latest influential definitions of suicide, formulated 
by de Leo et al., considers it as “an act with fatal outcome, which the deceased, 
knowing or expecting a potentially fatal outcome, has initiated and carried out 
with the purpose of bringing about wanted changes” (2006: 12; our emphasis). 
The common denominator in these definitions is the agentive involvement of the 
suicidé, who is conceived as the sole author of his/her own death. In fact, the vast 
majority of suicide definitions formulated within suicidology are in this respect 
very similar. They identify the suicidé as the agent of the act “to distinguish between 
homicide and suicide” and invoke his/her intent, knowing, or comprehension to 
distinguish “between accidental and suicidal behavior” (andriessen 2006: 534). 
The World Health Organization has even replaced the terms “suicide” and “suicide 
attempt” with “intentional self-harm” in its lexicon, which clearly highlights the 
centrality of intentional agency.
Intention and comprehension appear to be fundamental aspects of any definition 
of suicide, yet, for suicidologists, these are the features of the definition that are 
most difficult to operationalize. How can one ascertain the intentions of a deceased 
person? How can one deal with the multiplicity and sometimes contradictory 
nature of motives behind a single suicide act (andriessen 2006; see de Leo et al. 
2006)? What about suicidal acts in which “success” (mortality) depends on the 
ability or inability of another person to intervene in time? These questions become 
increasingly complex if we understand the self in certain contexts to be deeply 
relational rather than atomized. Yet, as some attempts at defining suicide without 
reference to intention or its equivalents have shown (cf. egel 1999), the category 
of suicide becomes fuzzy and indistinguishable from that of accidents, murders, or 
the behavior of mentally ill individuals. assessing the degree of human agency is 
central in determining causes of death, which in turn can be used to apportion legal 
and moral responsibility and blame of various kinds. in this respect, suicidology 
operates within the same logical framework as its nineteenth-century predecessors, 
not to mention the medieval courts whose distinction of an insane person not 
intending or comprehending the outcome of their own action (non compos mentis) 
from the sane one committing the conscious crime of self-murder (felo de se) 
(cf. Morrissey 2006: 41–2; Laragy 2013) seems likewise to rest on a notion of 
intentional agency.
emerging statistical records of national suicide mortality rates in the nineteenth 
century laid the foundation for a contrary conceptualization of the problem 
of intentionality: the diffusion of individual agency in suicide. ian Hacking 
summarized the problem thus:
despite visible trends and perturbations in the short term, national suicide rates 
are remarkably stable. This was noticed at the very beginning of suicide statistics 
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and led, in the 1850s, to bizarre but very influential arguments that human beings 
do not have free will since the proportion of those who kill themselves, in a 
given population, is itself a law of social nature. (Hacking 2008: 8)
according to Hacking, such radical conclusions stemmed from the fact that 
suicide had previously been treated by some thinkers as the ultimate proof of 
human agency or free will. david Hume, for example, opined that “the one power 
that we have and that the gods lack is that we can kill ourselves” (paraphrased by 
ian Hacking 2008: 4; see also Morrissey 2006: 3).
Later in the nineteenth century, emile durkheim drew a conceptual distinction 
between individual suicide cases on the one hand and suicide rates as a total social 
fact on the other. even though he never arrived at any convincing “link between 
the way individual suicides are committed and social causation” (gane 2005: 223), 
the overall message of his Le Suicide was nevertheless that “something as intimate 
as deciding to put an end to one’s life results from the inflictions of others” (Vargas 
2010: 209). This external other that ultimately causes suicide was for durkheim 
“society” viewed as having an ontology of its own (durkheim 1952: xiv). Thus, 
suicide was indicative not of the agency of the suicidé but of other processes or 
phenomena, such as the level of social integration of the victim. in effect, the 
intentional agency of the suicidé required by Durkheim’s definition of suicide 
is undermined by his main explanatory achievement. durkheim’s “invention” 
of social constraint gave rise to the structure vs. agency dilemma in the social 
sciences, which could be seen as yet another version of theological debates about 
an omnipotent god and impotent humans or philosophical debates about free will 
and determinism.
The “thèse psychiatrique” also effectively diminishes the agency-as-
responsibility of the suicidé by viewing any suicide as having been “caused” 
by mental illness or psychological disorder. Hence suicidal individuals became 
“positioned within this discourse of pathology as mentally unwell, and thus 
not fully responsible for their actions” (Marsh 2013: 749). The pathologizing 
“psy” discourses, which established individual suicide cases as indicative of 
the suicidé’s medical condition rather than their agency, implied causes that, 
we argue, are “outside the person” as much as the sociological causes. Mental 
illness, just like the genes of which it is often said to be an effect (cf. Bondy et al. 
2006; Mann et al. 2001), is conceptualized as part of one’s body and identity but 
also as an entity external to it, for it is not limited to a single individual. Rather, 
genetically determined dispositions to illness are imagined as being passed from 
one generation to another, and in this sense they are extra-individual (ingold 2000: 
134–9). Furthermore, the (mental) illness is often spoken about as an entity distinct 
from the one who suffers from it, which is even recognized and utilized in some 
therapeutic approaches (Topf 1995).
In the process of secularizing the study of suicide, the emerging scientific 
disciplines of moral statistics and psychiatry have called into question the 
individual agency in the act (Morrissey 2006: 2). The consequences of this 
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deflection of agency include both a de-criminalization and a de-politicization of 
suicide. Suicides ceased to be moral abominations but also ceased to be taken 
seriously as accusatory performances. The result of such changes is a tension of 
agency in suicide. The tension of agency is effective in popular and scholarly 
accounts of suicide whenever agency is deflected away from the suicidé towards 
sociological or psychological constraints (thus reducing the agent to the status 
of a victim), while simultaneously depending on an (at least implicit) notion of 
intentional agency in order to speak of suicide in the first place.
This volume offers a variety of examples of the tension of agency in suicide also 
from vernacular contexts. Broz (this volume), for instance, describes distributed 
agency in the context of a Siberian village, in which suicide is explained by a 
“soul-loss” prior to the suicidal act. The suicidé is thus rendered a victim, and 
their agentive involvement in the act is eroded to some degree. Reyes-Foster (this 
volume) describes a similar victimization of a suicidé in a yucatec Maya village, 
where the act is attributed to the workings of the devil. importantly, she observes 
convergences between these situated understandings of suicide and the biomedical 
discourse of mental illness imprinted in the state-sponsored suicide prevention 
program. She argues that the two interpretations proved surprisingly compatible 
because “the contradictory nature of the yucatecan attitude toward suicide is a 
sympathetic template upon which biomedical discourse can map itself.” it becomes 
evident from contributions in this volume, as well as from other ethnographies of 
suicide (e.g. Laidlaw 2005; imberton 2012), that the tension of agency in suicide, 
as described above, is not specific to contemporary Western scientific discourses. 
Rather, it can be found in most situated attempts at making sense of suicide.
Suicide and Personhood
in the previous section we argued that the tension of agency, the dialectic of agency 
and patiency is intimately related to situated understandings of intentionality and 
responsibility in suicide. in this section we will expand on our argument about the 
simultaneous denial and attribution of agency in suicide discourse by suggesting 
that this tension is associated with diverse ideas about personhood that are often 
subscribed to simultaneously.
Theoretical advances in the social sciences and humanities have gradually 
“provincialized” (cf. chakrabarty 2000) and destabilized Western conceptions of 
the bounded, unique human person as the only legitimate agent (geertz 1974). 
anthropologists have pointed out their anthropocentrism (Teubner 2006) and the 
more general Western “predilection for ‘entities’ and other static forms of being” 
(course 2007: 21) and “bias toward singularity” (callon and Law 1995: 499) when 
it comes to attribution of agency. contemporary social theory has effectively re-
extended the franchise of agency to “non-humans” (to paraphrase callon and Law 
1995: 482), be they animals or material objects of various kinds (see e.g. kirksey 
and Helmreich 2010; Latour 2005).
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in the light of data from non-Western socio-cultural contexts, human 
personhood has also been radically re-thought. For researchers following Marilyn 
Strathern’s (1988) influential study, persons in Melanesia and elsewhere are, “not 
the repository of a unitary or bounded identity but rather composed of social 
relations, and in this sense [thinkable] as ‘dividual’ or ‘partible’ entities” (carsten 
2003: 94) . in other words, they are “inherently social.” While numerous studies 
have demonstrated the theoretical appeal of such a conception of personhood, 
some have also challenged the dichotomy between Western “individual” and non-
Western “dividual,” partible, or composite persons. in response to new phenomena 
(such as reproductive and prosthetic technologies) and refined ethnographic 
sensibilities, anthropologists argued that the assumption of individual personhood 
in the West may be little more than utopian phantasies of liberal philosophers (see 
Ouroussoff 1993) and have reconceptualized it, alongside other social theorists 
(Haraway 1991, 1997), as equally “joined-up,” distributed, and relational (cf. 
carsten 2003: 95–108).
These advances in social theory have had little impact on the study of suicide, 
regardless of the enthusiastic call for an anthropological imagination in suicidology 
(cf. corin 1995; kral 1998). given the Western pedigree of suicidology, it is 
hardly surprising that it operates, as psychologist and ethnographer Michael kral 
argues, with a “person-centered view of suicide” (1998: 229).5 This categorical 
dependence on specifically Western and liberal regime of the self leads researchers 
to ignore “the historical and cultural formation of … suicidal subjects” and “the 
historical and cultural resources potentially able to counteract or resist suicide [as 
these] are seen to be of only marginal importance relative to the identification and 
treatment of individual mental disorders” (Marsh 2013: 749).
Many authors represented in this volume demonstrate the great potential 
of studying local conceptions of what it means to be a person and asking who 
else might be ascribed with agency in the suicide field. Persons and their others 
may contextually merge when humans are seen not as bounded subjects, whose 
behavior is influenced, shaped, or determined by social structures or bio-medical 
mechanisms, but as extended or distributed beyond the individual. Reyes-Foster, 
for example, speaks about the Mayan conception of personhood, in which “every 
person can extend into every other person that occupies the same place.” Broz 
argues that in altai (Siberia) domestic animals are a part of the personhood of their 
master and that they execute his or her agency. Many chapters also describe suicide 
fields in which important roles are given to entities, such as spirits or the devil, 
whose ontology must appear dubious from the perspective of Western suicidology.
5 We nevertheless disagree with Kral’s assertion that for suicidology “the ultimate 
origin of suicide, whatever the stressful precursors, lies within the person” (1998: 229). 
Rather, the “person-centered” view stands for what we called above the “requirement of 
agency,” while the “tension of agency” is created by the simultaneous placement of the 
origin of suicide outside the suicidé.
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Bringing local notions of personhood and agency into suicide studies once 
again raises questions about the universal applicability of the concept of suicide. 
If someone’s death is understood locally as having been inflicted by, say, an evil 
spirit, can we still speak about the compatibility of such a notion of death with 
suicidology’s category of suicide? How can one characterize acts of people that 
are seen locally as incomplete, de-composed? are they agents of their own death, 
and can they commit suicide? We believe that, regardless of such important doubts, 
the category of suicide retains its comparative appeal. First, as we have argued 
above, vernacular distributions of intentionality and responsibility in suicide 
fields could share certain similarities with the tension of agency in academic 
suicidology. Such similarity makes many vernacular and expert understandings 
more compatible with each other than commonly thought and thus makes the 
ubiquitous tension of agency a good basis for a transcultural study of suicide. 
Second, a priori limitation of the category of suicide to western contexts would 
only lead to schematized “West vs. the rest” oppositions. as Staples (this volume) 
warns us, the dichotomization of Western and non-Western notions of a person 
could be misleading, not only because western notions of personhood are often 
relational, but also because various non-western theories of the suicide problem 
invoke assumptions about the boundedness of individuals. Moreover, in many 
contexts, as Staples demonstrates in his indian ethnography, several notions of a 
person may be applied simultaneously:
Those engaged in suicide in india constitute themselves—and are constituted 
by others—both as individual agents who undertake unilateral acts intended, at 
the moment they occur, to result in particular outcomes; and as dispersed, fluid 
dividuals, where intent and consequences of a suicidal act are situated across a 
number of social agents—including parents and family members, spirits, and the 
evil eye. (Staples, this volume)
drawing on Staples’ argument, we suggest that at the heart of the “tension of 
agency in suicide” lie not only divergent yet concurrent notions of agency, as 
argued above, but also divergent yet simultaneously used notions of personhood. 
if a person is conceptualized as a unique individual and at the same time as a 
fluid dividual, he or she is then easily conceivable as being and simultaneously 
not being the sole author of his or her death. Such a perspective points to another 
aspect of the question of personhood and agency in suicide, namely, “person-
making” in the suicide field.
Suicidology generally assumes that the persons inhabiting the suicide fields 
exist prior to the act of suicide. While Jaworski (this volume) challenges this 
taken-for-granted premise from a Foucauldian, post-structuralist perspective, 
other authors do so by observing subjectivity and personhood in the making: they 
document the ways in which persons are contextually re-produced, often as immoral 
or moral, in their respective suicide fields. By doing so, they follow Ian Marsh’s 
call to observe the “formation of particular kinds of ‘suicidal subjectivities’ in 
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relation to the production and circulation of authoritative medical and psychiatric 
knowledge” (Marsh 2013: 751). Here the value added by anthropology lies in 
bringing examples of the formation of “suicidal subjectivities” from contexts 
characterized by very different views of morality and of (moral) personhood to the 
study of suicide and agency.
Suicide and Power: Agency and Patiency
Seen through the lens of power relations, acts of suicide are not only about death 
and dying but also about life and the living. conventional suicidologies seem to 
privilege death and pathology as the problem space of suicide. Moral statistics 
logically begin with the counting of unambiguously dead bodies, whereas the 
“medical/psychiatric style of thought” (Marsh 2013: 747) operates closely within 
a “compulsory ontology of pathology,” to use ian Marsh’s expression: “Suicide is 
formulated as pathological and individual, as tragic, and not to be read as in any way 
positive” (Marsh 2010: 47). yet many suicidal acts, as Tom Widger (this volume) 
writes in his chapter on Sri Lanka, “are rarely concerned with dying but seeking 
new ways of living.” in terms of ontology, many of the ethnographies assembled 
here place suicide in life rather than in death and pathology; they explore ways of 
living with suicide and the productivity of suicide in fields of power. The capacity 
of the living to do things with suicide is best captured by a classical notion of agency 
that refers to spaces of freedom and the human capacity to act within structures of 
power. The anthropology of suicide articulates with foundational anthropological 
questions about domination and resistance, hegemony and freedom, power and 
authorship (see Jaworski this volume). at the same time, the politics of suicide 
displays the same tension of agency—its dialectical denial and overemphasis—that 
is so ubiquitous in most suicide discourses. anthropological engagements with the 
articulation of suicide and power are simultaneously anthropologies of agency and 
patiency, free will and victimhood, and sovereignty and bare life (agamben 1998).
anthropological studies of suicide have pointed to the accusation inherent 
in most suicidal attempts and successful suicides, even those related to issues of 
“domestic justice” (Wu 2010). The question, then, is who is accused (implicitly or 
otherwise) through the suicidal act? does the rage of the suicidal violence speak 
to the suicidé’s immediate livelihood circumstances, does it reach to the local 
exploiter/violator, or is it an indictment of the larger structural violence of politics 
and political economy (see Farmer 2003)? anthropological theorizing on suicide, 
beginning with Malinowski (1978 [1926]) and Firth (1961), seems to agree that 
most suicides entail elements of accusation or revenge or of an indictment against 
wrongdoers in kinship affairs, and that suicides are ultimately communicative acts 
and have, in anthony giddens’ words, a “social aetiology” (giddens 1964, 1977).
Beyond the implicit micro politics of most suicides, anthropologists deal with 
explicitly political suicides (andriolo 2002, 2006; Feldman 1991) and stress that 
these suicides have a message and that it is their strategic objective, as karin 
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andriolo argues, to get that message across to whoever/whatever is responsible 
for the “wrong of moral, political, or economic dimension, a wrong that affects 
the lives of many” (2006: 102). She understands protest suicides as “embodied 
minding,” the quite literal inscription of a political message onto the body of 
the protester: “Protest suicide is dying with a message, for a message, and of a 
message. The body becomes the site on which self-destructive mimesis denounces 
the wrongs that humans have wrought” (andriolo 2006: 102). Sharp and Linos 
(this volume) move beyond such a communicative model of protest suicide, by 
considering the role of body parts in the tactical employment of suicide bombing 
by Palestinian combatants. One could argue that there is no message inscribed 
into these bodies, but that the blood, organs, and other body parts of the suicide 
attacker are themselves a necro-political pollutant with the potency to re-classify 
space as Palestinian instead of israeli.
Many authors in this volume take a different approach to political agency in 
suicide to that followed by andriolo, who clearly distinguishes protest suicides 
with clear-cut messages and political authorship—such as the deaths of hunger 
strikers in northern ireland, South asian self-immolations, and the case of 
the South korean farmer-activist who stabbed himself at the World Trade 
Organization’s cancún summit—from “regular” suicides with their histories 
of personal and psychological “suicidality.” instead, they examine the political 
content in “suicidality.” The challenge, we argue, is not to distinguish political 
from pathological suicides, but rather to move beyond voluntaristic understandings 
of self-destruction, which would require an autonomous will on the part of the 
suicidé to count as political. The ethnographies in this volume examine how 
less spectacular suicides (compared to public protest suicides) by young people 
(Staples this volume), indebted farmers (Münster this volume), or older women 
(chua this volume) may function as political acts, indictments against structures 
of constraint, or performances of “J’accuse” in the face of power, or how even 
quotidian suicide can create, as Widger (this volume) puts it, “opportunities for 
social and moral action and commentary.”
ethnographic attention to power and the political does not necessarily grant 
agency to the suicidé. A focus on the role of structural violence (Farmer 2004) and 
resistance may render the suicide just another “reflection” of political economic 
changes beyond the control of the individual. From this perspective, crises, 
transformations, and the violence of structures and organizations, as well as bad 
relationships of any sort, are too easily understood as “driving” the person to 
suicide. The agency of the suicidé is reduced to victimhood; their death ultimately 
becomes an effect of power. in considering suicide and power, there is thus a thin 
line between a denial of and an overemphasis of agency.
in making suicide the object of study, critically realist ethnographies of the 
contemporary human condition will have to engage with the epistemological 
challenge of adequately appreciating the diagnostic qualities of suicide. What 
do we learn about contemporary life and the effects of power on populations by 
studying suicide? does the study of suicide provide ethnographers with a diagnostic 
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tool for detecting “pathologies of power” (Farmer 2003) and the necro-politics of 
global capitalism? anthropologists will have to demonstrate how suicide can tell 
us better than other forms of human action about the central concerns of our times 
and about how people dwell in the contemporary world. The contributions to this 
volume, we believe, demonstrate the richness of the new perspectives that can be 
gained by studying fields of suicide, power, and agency.
Conclusion
in this introduction we have argued that most academic and vernacular notions 
of suicide are predicated on the agentive involvement of the suicidé. We have 
further demonstrated that both vernacular and scientific attempts to make sense of 
suicide simultaneously undermine or distribute the agency of the suicidé—their 
sole authorship of the act—which leads to what we call the tension of agency 
in suicide. ethnographic approaches to studying suicide, which most authors of 
this volume employ and advocate, do not overcome this tension of agency. On 
the contrary, as pointed out above, they create a similar kind of tension: most 
ethnographic studies treat suicides both as expressions of individual choice and as 
indicators of pathologies of power and larger structural constellations.
The lesson we draw from the works collected in this volume is that aiming 
to resolve the tension of agency in suicide is pointless. instead, we suggest 
focusing anthropological attention on the study of how this tension plays out in 
particular vernacular and scientific contexts and, using the reflexive faculty of 
anthropology, how it becomes manifest in our own analysis. The tension of agency 
in suicide points to a continuum of causality and responsibility, ranging from 
the sole authorship of the suicidé to plain victimhood of the suicidé subjected 
to external forces (social, chemical, invisible). The positioning of particular acts 
of self-destruction along this continuum is dialectically connected to the moral 
evaluation of suicide in particular contexts. On the one hand, convictions about the 
im/morality of suicide determine the un/ease with which the agentive involvement 
of the suicidé and even the categorization of particular deaths as suicide could be 
reinterpreted. On the other hand, ideas about suicidé’s agentive involvement in 
the act often determine local moral classification of suicide as a category. When 
people contest interpretations of particular suicides, they could be understood as 
rhetorically moving the case along the continuum and shifting emphasis between 
different and yet simultaneously used notions of personhood and agency. if 
someone is conceptualized as a unique individual and at the same time as a fluid 
dividual, they are then easily conceived as being and simultaneously not being 
the sole author of their death, depending on which understanding of the person is 
contextually stressed.
The authors of this volume see situated efforts to make sense of suicide as 
being predicated on specific notions of agency, intentionality, subjectivity, and 
personhood. in this sense, the anthropology of suicide, just like the dominant 
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“psychologizing” and “sociologizing” approaches, sees suicide as indicative of 
complex concerns. The reflexive enterprise of anthropology nevertheless aims at 
non-reductionist ways of understanding the indicative dimension of suicide. even 
when treating particular suicide fields as indicative of local notions of agency, 
personhood, or intentionality, suicide is never reduced to such notions; rather, 
these notions help us, in a manner of mutual explication, to better comprehend 
local ontologies of suicide.
We remain skeptical about a universal definition of suicide and, instead, work 
towards an anthropological notion of suicide by comparatively engaging with 
varieties of self-destructive action and their contested interpretations. Hence, 
the category of suicide is employed in this volume as a fluid heuristic tool, a 
provisional agreement about the subject of series of disagreements generated in 
each particular ethnographic setting, regardless of whether it stands for popular 
or authoritative knowledge. Such symmetrical treatment of different kinds of 
knowledge about suicide supports the overall claim of this volume, namely that 
the category of suicide is almost universally intertwined with particular notions 
of agency and personhood and with the connected tension of agency in suicide.
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